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1	McGREGOR W. SCOTT United States Attorney KATHERINE E. SCHUH Assistant United States Attorney 2500 Tulare Street, Suite 4401 Fresno, CA 93721 Telephone: (559) 497-4000 Facsimile: (559) 497-4099	
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6	Attorneys for Plaintiff United States of America	
7	officed States of Afficient	
8	IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT	
9	EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA	
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11	UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,	CASE NO. 1:20-CR-00096-NONE-SKO
12	Plaintiff,	STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE
13	v.	TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER
14	PEDRO DURAN,	DATE: November 18, 2020
15	Defendant.	TIME: 1:00 p.m. COURT: Hon. Sheila K. Oberto
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17	This case was previously set for a status conference on November 16, 2020. The date was	
18	moved to November 18, 2020 by order of this Court. This Court has issued a series of General Orders to	
19	address public health concerns related to COVID-19 and to suspend jury trials in the Eastern District of	
20	California. By stipulation, the parties now move to continue the status conference to March 3, 2021, and	
21	to exclude time between November 16, 2020 and March 3, 2021.	
22	Although the General Orders address the district-wide health concern, the Supreme Court has	
23	emphasized that the Speedy Trial Act's end-of-justice provision "counteract[s] substantive	
24	openendedness with procedural strictness," "demand[ing] on-the-record findings" in a particular case.	
25	Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S. 489, 509 (2006). "[W]ithout on-the-record findings, there can be no	
26	exclusion under" § 3161(h)(7)(A). <i>Id.</i> at 507. Moreover, any such failure cannot be harmless. <i>Id.</i> at	
27	509; see also United States v. Ramirez-Cortez, 22	13 F.3d 1149, 1153 (9th Cir. 2000) (explaining that a

28 judge ordering an ends-of-justice continuance must set forth explicit findings on the record "either orally

or in writing").

Based on the plain text of the Speedy Trial Act—which Zedner emphasizes as both mandatory and inexcusable—General Orders 611, 612, and 617 require specific supplementation. Ends-of-justice continuances are excludable only if "the judge granted such continuance on the basis of his findings that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial." 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A). Moreover, no such period is excludable unless "the court sets forth, in the record of the case, either orally or in writing, its reason or finding that the ends of justice served by the granting of such continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial." *Id*.

The General Orders exclude delay in the "ends of justice." 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7) (Local Code T4). Although the Speedy Trial Act does not directly address continuances stemming from pandemics, natural disasters, or other emergencies, this Court has discretion to order a continuance in such circumstances. For example, the Ninth Circuit affirmed a two-week ends-of-justice continuance following Mt. St. Helens' eruption. *Furlow v. United States*, 644 F.2d 764 (9th Cir. 1981). The court recognized that the eruption made it impossible for the trial to proceed. *Id.* at 767-68; *see also United States v. Correa*, 182 F. Supp. 326, 329 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (citing *Furlow* to exclude time following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and the resultant public emergency). The coronavirus is posing a similar, albeit more enduring, barrier to the prompt proceedings mandated by the statutory rules.

In light of the societal context created by the foregoing, this Court should consider the following case-specific facts in finding excludable delay appropriate in this particular case under the ends-of-justice exception, § 3161(h)(7) (Local Code T4). If continued, this Court should designate a new date for the status conference. *United States v. Lewis*, 611 F.3d 1172, 1176 (9th Cir. 2010) (noting any pretrial continuance must be "specifically limited in time").

STIPULATION

Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and through defendant's counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:

¹ The parties note that General Order 612 acknowledges that a district judge may make "additional findings to support the exclusion" at the judge's discretion. General Order 612, ¶ 5 (E.D. Cal. March 18, 2020).

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- 1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on November 16, 2020. It was then continued to November 18, 2020 by order of the Court.
- 2. By this stipulation, defendant now moves to continue the status conference until March 3, 2021, and to exclude time between November 16, 2020, and March 3, 2021, under Local Code T4.
 - 3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
 - a) The government has represented that discovery associated with this case includes investigative reports, numerous photographs and videos, hundreds of hours of recorded telephone conversations pursuant to wiretap order, cellular phone extractions, and large amounts of cellular telephone precise location data. This discovery has been either produced directly to counsel and/or made available for inspection and copying. Additionally, the government anticipates providing additional discovery in the coming months.
 - b) Counsel for defendant desires additional time consult with their clients, conduct further investigation, review the voluminous discovery, prepare for a possible trial, and to continue to explore a potential resolution of the case.
 - c) Counsel for defendant believes that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny him/her the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
 - d) The government does not object to the continuance.
 - e) Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
 - f) For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of November 16, 2020 to March 3, 2021, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(ii), (iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.

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2	4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the	
3	Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial	
4	must commence.	
5	IT IS SO STIPULATED.	
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8	Dated: November 9, 2020 MCGREGOR W. SCOTT United States Attorney	
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10	/s/ KATHERINE E. SCHUH KATHERINE E. SCHUH	
11	Assistant United States Attorney	
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13	Dated: November 9, 2020 /s/ Anthony P. Capozzi Anthony P. Capozzi	
14	Counsel for Defendant Pedro Duran	
15		
16	FINDINGS AND ORDER	
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18	IT IS SO ORDERED.	
19	Dated: November 10, 2020 S Sheila K. Oberto	
20	UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE	
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